Louisiana Law Review
Volume 75 | Number 1
Fall 2014

The Strife of Riley: The Search-Incident
Consequences of Making an Easy Case Simple
Leslie A. Shoebotham

Repository Citation
Leslie A. Shoebotham, The Strife of Riley: The Search-Incident Consequences of Making an Easy Case Simple, 75 La. L. Rev. (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol75/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

The Strife of Riley: The Search-Incident
Consequences of Making an Easy Case Simple
Leslie A. Shoebotham*
ABSTRACT
In Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment requires police officers to obtain a warrant before
searching an arrestee’s cellular phone in a search incident to a lawful
arrest. The lauded decision heralds the modernization of the Fourth
Amendment to embrace privacy in the digital age. But Riley’s
reasoning contains a flaw that only Justice Alito recognized. Evidence
gathering—i.e., the need to look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime
for use at trial—has long justified law enforcement’s authority to
perform incident searches. Indeed, evidence-gathering searches
incident to arrest were recognized as legitimate searches over a
century before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. The Riley
Court ignored this pedigree, however. Despite the doctrine’s
centuries-long history, Riley concluded that the authority to search
incident to arrest was defined by a trilogy of cases—California v.
Chimel, United States v. Robinson, and Arizona v. Gant—cases that
date back only to 1969. Based on the Chimel line, Riley concluded that
the justifications for performing an incident search were limited to
officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence. And the only
evidence-gathering incident search that Riley recognized was based
on Gant; an incident search of the passenger compartment of an
arrestee’s vehicle that Riley justified solely on the “unique
circumstances” involved in the automobile context, not the searchincident doctrine’s historical evidence-gathering basis. Therein lies
the concern. By ignoring the doctrine’s evidence-gathering history,
Riley has reorganized the search-incident doctrine into a rigid
Chimel-based rule that just so happens to have a vehicle exception.
This Article amplifies Justice Alito’s admonition that evidence
gathering must be recognized as a legitimate justification for police to
search incident to arrest. This Article addresses the consequences of
Riley’s digital-age reboot of the search-incident doctrine,
especially Riley’s limitation of Gant to the vehicle context—a
restriction that was, ironically enough, not necessary for imposing
Copyright 2014, by LESLIE A. SHOEBOTHAM.
* Victor H. Schiro Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans
College of Law; LL.M., Tulane University School of Law; J.D., University of
Houston Law Center; B.S.N., University of Texas Medical Branch. I would like
to thank my research assistants, Andrea Jones and H. Rick Yelton, for their
excellent research skills in preparing this Article.

30

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

a warrant requirement on cell phone searches. Rather than relying
solely on Chimel’s two “concerns,” this Article argues that the
search-incident doctrine has been supported—both before and
after Chimel—by three justifications: officer safety, preservation of
evidence, and importantly, the need to discover evidence of the
crime of arrest. Without evidence gathering as an implicit
justification in a properly limited search incident to arrest, Riley’s
limitation of Gant calls into doubt law enforcement’s authority to
perform an incident search of an arrestee’s reaching distance—a
Chimel search—to look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime once
the arrestee has been handcuffed and is adequately secured. All
things considered, Riley represents much more than a commonsense warrant requirement for cell phone searches. Riley is the
deceptively simple beginning of the end of evidence gathering as a
justification in a properly limited search incident to arrest.
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INTRODUCTION
Lurking behind this issue [of warrantless searches of cell
phones incident to arrest] is the question whether and when a
laptop or desktop computer, [or] tablet . . . can be searched
without a warrant—for a modern cell phone is a computer.1
Americans love their gadgets. As technology has made
electronic devices more portable, Americans increasingly carry
with them devices that provide access to their most private
information, both financial and personal.2 That people carry
cellular phones is a self-evident truth. Advances in technology
have meant that modern cell phones do much more than make
phone calls, however. So-called “smart phones,” such as Droid,
Galaxy, and iPhone, provide advanced computing capabilities to
their users, including Internet access.3 The storage capability of
such devices is vast.4 Built-in apps and downloadable third-party
apps allow people to perform a myriad of tasks—everything from
playing Angry Birds5 to accessing live video of the interior of their
1. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 804 (2012).
2. Cf. City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (“Cell
phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons
may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for selfexpression, even self-identification.”).
3. PCMag.com’s online encyclopedia defines a smart phone as:
A cellular telephone with built-in applications and Internet access. In
addition to digital voice service, modern smartphones provide text
messaging, e-mail, Web browsing, still and video cameras, MP3 player
and video playback and calling. In addition to their built-in functions,
smartphones run myriad free and paid applications, turning the once
single-minded cellphone into a mobile personal computer.
Definition of: Smartphone, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia
/term/51537/smartphone, archived at http://perma.cc/FAT5-DA34 (last visited
Sept. 7, 2014).
4. Apple’s iPhone 5, for example, comes with up to 64 gigabytes of storage.
See Tech Specs, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone-5s/specs/, archived at
http://perma.cc/7EMD-AZ72 (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). This device’s storage
capacity is equivalent to about “four million pages of Microsoft Word
documents.” See Charles E. MacLean, But, Your Honor, a Cell Phone is Not a
Cigarette Pack: An Immodest Call for a Return to the Chimel Justifications for
Cell Phone Memory Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 38,
42 (2012) (“A cell phone with just one gigabyte of memory can store over 64,000
pages of Microsoft Word text, or over 100,000 pages of e-mails, or over 675,000
pages of text files.”).
5. Rovio Entm’t Ltd., Angry Birds, APPLE, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app
/angry-birds/id343200656?mt=8, archived at http://perma.cc/Q6MM-5YA8 (last
visited Sept. 7, 2014) (describing strategy of game as: “The survival of the
Angry Birds is at stake. Dish out revenge on the greedy pigs who stole their
eggs”).
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homes.6 As the United States First Circuit Court of Appeals
observed in United States v. Wurie: “In short, individuals today
store much more personal information on their cell phones than
could ever fit in a wallet, address book, briefcase, or any of the
other traditional containers . . . .”7 Although password protection of
cell phones and portable electronic devices provides some measure
of protection for the phone or device’s stored data, that protection is
technological, not constitutional.8 Without protection from the United
States Supreme Court, an incident search of even a password-protected
cellular phone was likely already technologically feasible for law
enforcement to perform.9
Against this backdrop, prior to Riley v. California10 most courts
ignored the privacy implications of cell phone searches and,
6. SKJM, LLC, iCam – Webcam Video Streaming, APPLE, https://itunes
.apple.com/us/app/icam-webcam-video-streaming/id296273730?m t=8, archived
at http://perma.cc/BD9T-TYNM (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). In United States v.
Flores-Lopez, Judge Posner, writing for a panel of the Seventh Circuit, used this
particular downloadable app to illustrate how intrusive a warrantless cell phone
search could be—by providing police with the functional equivalent to physical
entry into the cell phone owner’s home. See 670 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“At the touch of a button a cell phone search becomes a house search . . . .”).
7. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d, Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
8. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a
Password Save Your Cell Phone From a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 1125, 1174 (2011) (discussing password protection issues under Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, and concluding that “[a]s a legal matter, password
protecting the phone provides virtually no additional protection against police
searches of cell phones incident to arrest”).
9. See, e.g., What is XRY?, MICRO SYSTEMATION, http://www.msab.com
/xry/what-is-xry, archived at http://perma.cc/VD64-MFUV (last visited Sept. 7,
2014) (“XRY is a software application designed to run on the Windows
operating system which allows you to perform a secure forensic extraction of
data from a wide variety of mobile devices, such as smartphones, gps navigation
units, 3G modems, portable music players and the latest tablet processors such
as the iPad.”); XRY Field Version, MICRO SYSTEMATION, http://www.msa
b.com/xry/field-version, archived at http://perma.cc/9FJB-NLC6 (last visited
Sept. 7, 2014) (“The Field Versions [of the XRY program] incorporate . . .
hardware and software combined to perform a complete and rapid analysis for
the vast majority of mobile devices available today.”).
10. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). Riley involved two cases that were consolidated
for the Court’s consideration because both raised the question of “whether the
police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized
from an individual who has been arrested.” Id. at 2480. Compare Wurie, 728
F.3d at 13 (articulating categorical rule prohibiting cell phone searches incident
to arrest), with People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 8, 2013) (upholding incident search of defendant’s cellular phone because
phone was found on his person in search incident to arrest), rev’d and remanded
by Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473.
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instead, relied on the Court’s bright-line search-incident rules to
uphold warrantless searches of arrestees’ cellular phones.11 Based
on these courts’ interpretations of the search-incident doctrine,
police were entitled to peruse high-privacy electronic devices like
cellular phones, regardless of the phone owner’s crime of arrest.
Therefore, police treated the arrestee’s cellular phone as simply
another “container” that could be “opened”—scrolled through—
during a search incident to arrest, in the same way that
conventional containers, like pill bottles, were routinely opened.12
In Riley, the Court was called upon to address a split that had
arisen between courts that imposed a categorical warrant
requirement on incident searches of cellular phones and courts that
supported a bright-line rule permitting warrantless cell phone
searches if the phone was found on the arrestee’s person in a
search incident to arrest.13
Riley established a bright-line rule prohibiting warrantless cell
phone searches in all but exigent circumstances,14 eschewing an
approach that would have allowed courts to determine the
admissibility of cell phone data by performing a case-specific
11. See, e.g., Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 803–10 (upholding warrantless cell
phone search incident to defendant’s arrest for drug trafficking because search
of phone—which was limited to obtaining phone’s own telephone number—was
minimally intrusive and the need to preserve phone’s evidence could not be
completely ruled out); United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 711–13 (5th Cir.
2011) (upholding warrantless incident search of phone on which arrestee was
talking when police stopped his vehicle); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 F. App’x
216, 225 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding warrantless incident search of cellular
phone found on arrestee’s person); United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411–
12 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting defendant’s argument that warrantless incident
searches of cellular phones be limited to phones that have “small storage
capacity”).
12. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (acknowledging that a “mechanical
application” of United States v. Robinson’s bright-line search-incident rule
“might well support the warrantless [cell phone] searches at issue here”); see
also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
13. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480; see also supra note 10. Although Riley
considered the validity of warrantless cell phone searches, some lower courts
upheld warrantless incident searches of other portable electronic devices
including digital cameras, laptop computers, iPods, and tablets—if the device
was found on the arrestee’s person in a search incident to arrest. See generally In
re Alfredo C., No. B225715, 2011 WL 4582325, at *1–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 5,
2011) (upholding incident search of digital camera found on arrestee’s person in
search incident to arrest).
14. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485, 2487 (holding that “officers must generally
secure a warrant before conducting [a cell phone] search” but could rely on
exigent circumstances to immediately search an arrestee’s phone if police were
“truly confronted with a now or never situation” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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balancing of interests.15 Riley was a rare unanimous decision in
which the Court—in an opinion authored by the Chief Justice—
seemed to mirror society’s distaste for the intrusive police
practice.16 The Riley Court framed its analysis of warrantless cell
phone searches on three cases that Riley characterized as the
search-incident doctrine’s “trilogy”17: Chimel v. California,18
United States v. Robinson,19 and Arizona v. Gant.20 In reaching its
common sense warrant requirement for cell phone searches, Riley
might seem to have simply reaffirmed the alternative holdings in
Gant—the third of Riley’s trilogy cases—both Gant’s holding that
strictly limited law enforcement’s authority to conduct warrantless
vehicle searches incident to arrest and the holding that approved an
evidence-gathering search of an arrestee’s vehicle incident to
arrest.21 This Article argues that Riley did much more, however,
limiting Gant in ways that conflict with the search-incident
doctrine’s historical basis. Although Riley’s categorical protection
of cell phone data has been applauded,22 the Riley Court’s view of
the search-incident doctrine will produce critically important
consequences outside the cell phone context and, additionally,
suggests a reorganization of the search-incident doctrine more
generally.
Importantly, Riley’s limitation of Gant was unnecessary to the
Court’s quite sensible conclusion that police must obtain a warrant
15. Id. at 2491 (noting the Court’s “general preference to provide clear
guidance to law enforcement through categorical rules”).
16. See id. at 2494–95 (“Modern cell phones are not just another
technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they
hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’” (quoting Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))).
17. Id. at 2484.
18. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
19. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
20. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
21. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (citing Gant, 556 U.S. at 343).
22. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court Saves Cellphone Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2014, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/opinion
/the-supreme-court-saves-cellphone-privacy.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6R
YA-PE6F (“Still, [the Riley Court’s] ruling reaffirmed the essence of the Fourth
Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures . . . even though the
Bill of Rights was written by men who could not have imagined an iPhone in
their maddest dreams.”); Opinion, Smart Phones and the Fourth Amendment,
WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2014), http://online.wsj.com?articles/smart-phones-andthe-fourth-amendment-1403738424#livefyre-comment, archived at http://perma.
cc/J9BJ-KJ2N (describing the Riley Court’s “wise[]” decision to require a
warrant to search arrestee’s cellular phone as recognizing the “truth” and
observing that “[l]iberals often claim the Constitution must change to
accommodate a new era, though the genius of the document is that its core
protections are abiding and universal”).
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to search an arrestee’s cellular phone.23 Riley’s warrant
requirement for cell phone searches was fully supported by Riley’s
treatment of cellular phones as a special “category of effects”24—a
search that was different from traditional incident searches
because, from a practical perspective, a cell phone search could not
be limited to law enforcement’s perusal of cell phone data related
to the arrest scene or even to the crime of arrest itself.25 Instead,
Riley’s gratuitous limitation of Gant—concluding that evidencegathering incident searches were permissible only for arrestees’
vehicles26—likely portends a modern reorganization of the searchincident doctrine. Without evidence gathering as an implicit
justification in a properly limited search incident to arrest, Riley’s
limitation of Gant calls into doubt law enforcement’s authority to
perform an incident search of an arrestee’s reaching distance—a
Chimel search—to look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime once
the arrestee has been handcuffed and is adequately secured.
Rather than relying solely on Chimel’s two “concerns,”27 this
Article argues that the search-incident doctrine has been
supported—both before and after Chimel—by three justifications:
officer safety, preservation of evidence, and importantly, the need
to discover evidence of the crime of arrest. And, according to
Justice Alito—who concurred in Riley to make the evidencegathering argument—nothing in the past 100 years, including
Chimel and its progeny cases, has eliminated the evidence23. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485; see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
24. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85; see infra notes 52–54 and
accompanying text.
25. See generally Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (determining legitimacy of
warrantless cell phone searches by asking “whether application of the search
incident to arrest doctrine to this particular category of effects would untether
the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The Riley Court additionally found it important that
technology presently exists that allows law enforcement to easily prevent the
loss of cell phone data while awaiting a warrant to search an arrestee’s phone.
See id. at 2487; see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
26. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492 (rejecting government’s argument that “the
Gant standard be imported from the vehicle context” because “Gant relied on
circumstances unique to the vehicle context to endorse a search solely for the
purpose of gathering evidence” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Chief Justice Roberts’s desire to limit Gant should come as a surprise
to no one. Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote the Court’s opinion in Riley, also
joined Justice Alito’s cogent dissent in Gant. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
364 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s approach in Gant
“leaves the law relating to searches incident to arrest in a confused and unstable
state”); see infra notes 182–185 and accompanying text.
27. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (“We first consider each Chimel concern in
turn.”).
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gathering rationale as justifying a properly limited incident
search.28 If Chimel, Robinson, and Gant are the search-incident
doctrine’s “trilogy,”29 then Justice Alito’s Riley concurrence makes
clear that he was unwilling to ignore the doctrine’s prequel—
search-incident cases that upheld as reasonable law enforcement’s
authority to search for evidence of the crime of arrest within the
areas permitted in a properly limited search incident to arrest.30
In Part I, this Article considers the Riley decision’s analytical
framework, including the narrow universe of search-incident cases
that Riley deemed applicable in determining the cell phone cases
and, additionally, Riley’s refusal to consider evidence gathering as
a legitimate justification to search in a properly limited incident
search. Part II traces the evolution of incident searches, first as a
warrantless evidence-gathering search that turned on the search’s
reasonableness, then through the search’s reorientation to a warrant
exception justified by arrest-related exigency in Chimel and the
cases that generalized Chimel, and more recently Gant, where a
hybrid evidence-gathering incident search of vehicles was
recognized. Additionally, Part II posits that although Chimel and
its progeny were intended to provide clear boundaries on incident
searches—i.e., the arrestee’s reaching distance—to use in training
law enforcement officers in the field, these cases did not eliminate
law enforcement’s authority to perform an evidence-gathering
search within the areas permitted in a properly limited search
incident to arrest. Part III considers the consequences of Riley’s
reconfiguration of Gant, including the potential doctrinal
instability that Riley’s retcon search-incident rule will produce and
Riley’s likely impact on law enforcement’s authority to perform an
incident search of an arrestee’s reaching distance once arrestrelated exigency no longer exists because the arrestee has been
handcuffed and is adequately secured. Part IV concludes.
I. RILEY V. CALIFORNIA: THE SAVIOR OF CELL PHONE PRIVACY
As the text makes clear, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is “reasonableness.” Our cases have determined
that where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials
to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . .
reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial
warrant. . . . In the absence of a warrant, a search is
28. See id. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring); see infra notes 69–71 and
accompanying text.
29. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (majority opinion).
30. See id. at 2495–96 (Alito, J., concurring); see infra notes 69–71.
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reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the
warrant requirement.31
Center stage in Riley’s consideration of warrantless cell phone
searches is the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.32 Although the search-incident
doctrine has existed for centuries, Riley decided the cell phone search
cases based on three search-incident cases that date back only to
196933: Chimel v. California,34 United States v. Robinson,35 and
Arizona v. Gant.36 In Chimel, the Court articulated generalized rules to
establish the scope of incident searches, justifying this warrant
exception on the exigency arising from arrest itself: (1) safety—the
need to disarm the arrestee and remove weapons from the arrestee’s
immediate control, and (2) preservation of evidence—preventing the
concealment or destruction of evidence.37 Chimel represented an
important reorientation of the search-incident doctrine—a doctrine
that, prior to Chimel, had been based on the need to gather evidence
from the arrestee and the area of the arrestee’s possession for use at
trial.38 But the pre-Chimel search-incident doctrine had proven almost
impossible to apply because of differing views regarding how broadly
law enforcement could search the arrestee’s environment in an
evidence-gathering search incident to arrest.39 Chimel therefore limited
a search incident to arrest to the person of the arrestee and the area
“within his immediate control”40—the arrestee’s reaching distance—
based on the exigency arising from arrest, and in doing so, placed
critically important outer boundaries on the scope of incident
searches.

31. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (majority opinion) (first ellipsis in original)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
32. See id. (“The two [cell phone] cases before us concern the
reasonableness of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.”). The Fourth
Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
34. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
35. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
36. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
37. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
38. See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755 (observing that “[t]he decisions of this
Court bearing upon [the search-incident-to-arrest exception] have been far from
consistent, as even the most cursory review makes evident”); see infra notes 87–
99 and accompanying text.
40. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. See infra text accompanying note 119.
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In applying Chimel, the Riley Court was quick to dismiss that
the first of Chimel’s concerns—officer safety—could be furthered
by warrantless cell phone searches.41 As Riley explained, once an
arrestee’s phone has been seized and secured, “data on the phone
can endanger no one.”42 Chimel’s second concern—preventing the
destruction of evidence—required a broader discussion involving
cell phone technology: remote wiping of cell phone data and data
encryption.43 Remote wiping occurs when a phone receives a
signal from another location, perhaps sent by a third party, that
erases the cellular phone’s stored data.44 Data encryption, on the
other hand, is a security feature that protects a cell phone’s stored
data from anyone who does not know the phone’s password.45
Riley dismissed the government’s remote wiping and data
encryption arguments with a two-pronged analysis: diminish and
distinguish.
First, Riley diminished the factual basis for the government’s
preservation-of-evidence argument, stating that the Court had
“been given little reason to believe that either problem [of remote
wiping of cell phone data and data encryption was] prevalent.”46
Second, Riley distinguished Chimel—which the Riley Court
explained had focused exclusively on the actions of the arrestee—
not on concerns that a third party might attempt to destroy
evidence.47 And perhaps most importantly, Riley explained that if
41. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (majority
opinion).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 2486.
44. See id. Prior to Riley, one of the primary legal issues that courts wrestled
with in the cell phone cases concerned whether the information stored on an
arrestee’s cellular phone remained sufficiently “destructible,” despite the
phone’s seizure, that the search-incident doctrine supported a warrantless search
of the phone’s electronic contents. Some courts concluded that data stored on an
arrestee’s cellular phone was “destructible,” within the meaning of Chimel,
because cell phone data could be lost through a “remote wipe”—a function that
is available through most cell phone service providers or by purchasing a
downloadable app—which removes data from the device after it is in a third party’s
hands. See, e.g., Definition of: Remote Wipe, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com
/encyclopedia/term/66274/remote-wipe, archived at http://perma.cc/9N3Q-GL4V
(last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (“Using the Internet to establish the connections, the
primary purpose of a remote wipe is to remove private data from a stolen smartphone,
tablet or laptop computer. It may also delete apps and the OS [operating system],
rendering the device useless.”); see generally United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d
803, 807–09 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing remote wiping of cell phone data).
45. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486.
46. Id.
47. Id. (“[T]hese broader concerns about the loss of evidence [from remote
wiping of cell phone data and data encryption] are distinct from Chimel’s focus
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police were concerned that a third party might attempt to remotely
wipe an arrestee’s cellular phone, law enforcement could take
preventative steps short of searching the phone by placing it in a
“Faraday bag”—an inexpensive, lightweight aluminum bag that
isolates the phone from electronic signals that would otherwise
delete the phone’s stored data.48
Riley also distinguished United States v. Robinson, a searchincident decision that applied Chimel’s twin rationales to the
“search of the contents of an item found on an arrestee’s person.”49
Robinson upheld the arresting officer’s authority to search a
cigarette package—in which contraband was discovered—that the
officer found in Robinson’s coat pocket in a search incident to his
arrest for driving with a revoked license.50 As Riley explained, the
Robinson Court concluded that the cigarette-pack search was
reasonable—even though the arresting officer was not specifically
concerned that Robinson might attempt to destroy evidence or that
Robinson was armed—because Chimel’s two risks “are present in
all custodial arrests” involving incident searches of “physical
objects.”51
But Riley declined to apply Robinson to incident searches of
cellular phones despite acknowledging that a “mechanical
application” of Robinson “might well support” warrantless cell
phone searches.52 Riley explained that Robinson’s bright-line
conclusion that “physical objects” always present some danger to
law enforcement and a risk that evidence might be destroyed was
distinguishable from cellular phones—a “category of effects” that

on a defendant who responds to arrest by trying to conceal or destroy evidence
within his reach.”).
48. See id. at 2487 (observing that Faraday bags are “essentially sandwich
bags made of aluminum foil: cheap, lightweight, and easy to use”).
49. Id. at 2488 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
50. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220, 223.
51. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483–85 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236)
(explaining that Robinson “did not draw a line between a search of Robinson’s
person and a further examination of the cigarette pack found during that
search”). Riley noted, however, that the Court “clarified” Robinson’s bright-line
rule in a later case by limiting this search exception to “personal property . . .
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee,” which the Court in
United States v. Chadwick concluded did not include a “200-pound, locked
footlocker” that law enforcement had seized from the arrestees’ control and
stored at a different location. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)).
52. See id. at 2484 (2014); see supra note 12.
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do not implicate either of Chimel’s concerns.53 Although Riley
distinguished Robinson’s bright-line rule based on the “context of the
physical objects,” subsequent language revealed that Riley was more
concerned with the phone’s contents—which Riley described as
encompassing “vast quantities of personal [digital] information.”54
Finally, Riley also dispatched Arizona v. Gant,55 the third of the
Court’s so-called “trilogy” cases.56 As Riley explained, Gant’s two
holdings limited the availability of a Chimel-based search of an
arrestee’s vehicle and, additionally, recognized “an independent
exception” for the warrantless search of a vehicle’s passenger
compartment “when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”57 Gant’s
evidence-gathering search, Riley explained, “stems not from
Chimel . . . but from ‘circumstances unique to the vehicle
context’”;58 “unique circumstances” that Riley described as “a
reduced expectation of privacy and heightened law enforcement
needs when it comes to motor vehicles.”59 Because cell phone
searches “bear neither of those characteristics,” Riley distinguished
Gant’s evidence-gathering search of an arrestee’s vehicle from
warrantless cell phone searches.60 Finding that the search-incident
trilogy—Chimel, Robinson, and Gant—did not control the
question of warrantless cell phone searches, Riley held “that

53. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85. Riley rejected the government’s
argument that cell phone data was searchable if police could have obtained the
information from “a pre-digital counterpart” because both the volume of data
stored on a phone and the “range of items” stored thereon made it unlikely that
people could carry “such a variety of information in physical form.” Id. at 2493.
54. See id. at 2485, 2490 (“Although the data stored on a cell phone is
distinguished from physical records by quantity alone, certain types of data are
also qualitatively different.”).
55. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
56. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
57. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Gant, 556 U.S. at
343).
58. See id. (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343).
59. Id. at 2492 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Gant, 556 U.S. at
343) (“Justice Scalia’s Thornton opinion, on which Gant was based, explained
that those unique circumstances are ‘a reduced expectation of privacy’ and
‘heightened law enforcement needs’ when it comes to motor vehicles.” (quoting
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
60. See id. Riley additionally distinguished Gant’s evidence-gathering
search because it would have provided no practical limitation on warrantless cell
phone searches. See id. (“It would be a particularly inexperienced or
unimaginative law enforcement officer who could not come up with several
reasons to suppose evidence of just about any crime could be found on a cell
phone.”).
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officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting [a cell
phone] search.”61
Importantly, Riley’s discussion of Gant did more than simply
distinguish between incident searches of vehicles and incident
searches of cellular phones. Riley placed Gant’s two warrantless
searches into separate warrant-exception categories, implicitly
redefining Gant’s evidence-gathering search—from a search that was
based on the search-incident doctrine’s historical evidence-gathering
justification62 to, instead, an elaboration on the automobile
exception.63 Even accepting as true Gant’s unsurprising comment that
its evidence-gathering search did not “follow” from Chimel, it is
another thing altogether to maintain, as Riley did, that Gant’s search
did not arise from the search-incident doctrine.64 In so saying, Riley
seemingly detached Gant’s evidence-gathering search from the searchincident doctrine and recast that search as a reasonable suspicionbased variant of the automobile exception.65
II. THE SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST DOCTRINE: AN ANCIENT
RULE
This right [to search for evidence of crime] has been
uniformly maintained in many cases.66
Is 100 years ancient? For the Riley Court, it apparently was.67
Although Justice Alito concurred in the Riley judgment,68 he wrote
61. See id. at 2485; see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
62. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492; see supra notes 57–60 and accompanying
text. Although the Gant majority distinguished between Gant’s two holdings—
explaining that Gant’s evidence-gathering search “d[id] not follow from
Chimel”—Gant in no way suggested that its evidence-gathering holding was
independent of, or had not arisen from, the search-incident doctrine. See Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). Riley went further than Gant, however,
limiting the availability of Gant’s evidence-gathering search to the “unique
circumstances” involved in the vehicle search context. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at
2492.
63. The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement authorizes law enforcement to perform a warrantless probable cause
based search of a vehicle due to the vehicle’s mobility and because the pervasive
regulation of vehicles has reduced society’s reasonable expectation of privacy in
vehicles. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).
64. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–86, 2492 (discussing and treating Gant’s
evidence-gathering search as an “independent exception” from the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, suggesting thereby that the warrant
exception for Gant’s evidence-gathering search was not derived from searchincident doctrine).
65. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
66. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
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separately to emphasize that it was a “mistake” for the Court to
determine the legitimacy of warrantless cell phone searches based
solely on Chimel and its progeny.69 Justice Alito argued that the
Riley Court erred in ignoring the “ancient rule” of the searchincident doctrine—a rule that “antedates the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment by at least a century,”70 and for which the Court
previously concluded that the adoption of “the Fourth Amendment
did not disturb this [ancient] rule.”71
Yet, the Court in Riley substantially trimmed the exception’s
history—and, therefore, pedigree—writing that “the existence of
the [search-incident-to-arrest] exception . . . has been recognized
for a century, [and] its scope has been debated for nearly as
long.”72 In fact, not only is the search-incident doctrine much older
than the Riley Court admitted, but Riley additionally failed to
acknowledge the doctrine’s historical basis—the need to discover
evidence for use at the arrestee’s trial.73 Commentators have
confirmed that the authority to search an arrestee has existed since

67. Compare Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (majority opinion) and infra text
accompanying note 72, with Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring) and
infra note 69–71 and accompanying text.
68. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Riley
Court’s conclusion that the Fourth Amendment did not support warrantless
incident searches of arrestees’ cellular phones).
69. See id. at 2495–96 (arguing that pre-Chimel cases did not support the
Riley Court’s view that search-incident doctrine “was based exclusively or
primarily” on officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence).
70. Id. (disagreeing with the Riley Court’s reliance on Chimel because
“Chimel’s reasoning is questionable” and, additionally, disagreeing with Riley’s
approach of ignoring pre-Chimel cases which had applied the “ancient” searchincident rule). Further, Justice Alito observed that relying solely on Chimel’s
justifications was not logically consistent with how the Court had applied the
search-incident doctrine in other contexts:
What ultimately convinces me that the rule is not closely linked to the
need for officer safety and evidence preservation is that these rationales
fail to explain the rule’s well-recognized scope. It has long been
accepted that written items found on the person of an arrestee may be
examined and used at trial. But once these items are taken away from
an arrestee (something that obviously must be done before the items are
read), there is no risk that the arrestee will destroy them. Nor is there
any risk that leaving these items unread will endanger the arresting
officers.
Id. at 2496.
71. See id. at 2495 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392).
72. Id. at 2482 (majority opinion).
73. Cf. id. at 2483–85 (limiting analysis of cell phone question to Chimel
and Chimel-based search-incident cases).
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at least the seventeenth century.74 Importantly, searches incident to
arrest were routinely justified by the need to obtain evidence for
use at trial and were rarely the subject of constitutional challenge.75
In discussing the search-incident doctrine’s evidence-gathering
justification, Judge Cardozo observed that a “dearth of illustrative
precedent both in our own country and abroad” supported searches
of legally arrested persons to look for evidence of crime.76
Treatises written in the nineteenth century likewise assumed that
evidence gathering was a legitimate reason to search incident to
arrest—to discover evidence for use at the arrestee’s trial.77Indeed,
a lawful arrest authorized the arresting officer to search and seize
property that could afford:
[E]vidence of the crime charged, or means of identifying
the criminal, or may be helpful in making an escape. The
officer has the undoubted right to make the search, and,
considering the nature of the accusation, he may, when
acting in good faith, take into his possession any articles he
may suppose will aid in securing the conviction of the
prisoner, or will prevent escape.78
74. Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 764 (1994) (citing TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 28–29 (1969)) (describing Professor Telford Taylor’s “brilliant
study of the Fourth Amendment” as reminding that “since at least the
seventeenth century, the common law has recognized broad authority to search
an arrestee and his immediate surroundings without a search warrant, and even
when the arrest itself was warrantless”).
75. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105
YALE L.J. 393, 401 (1995) (“Searches for bloody shirts, murder weapons, and
stolen goods, as long as they were incident to arrest, remained legal, indeed
unchallenged.”).
76. People v. Chiagles, 142 N.E. 583, 583–84 (N.Y. 1923) (“The books
speak broadly of searching the person of the prisoner for anything that may be of
use as evidence upon the trial . . . or for anything that will aid in securing the
conviction . . . .” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
77. See e.g., F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 60, at 45
(8th ed. 1880); J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 210–12, at 127 (2d ed.
1872). As Professor Bishop explained, the arresting officer was authorized to
search:
[T]he prisoner’s person, or [for items] otherwise in his possession, [to
look for] either goods or moneys which there is reason to believe are
connected with the supposed crime as its fruits, or as the instruments
with which it was committed, or as directly furnishing evidence relating
to the transaction, [and the arresting officer] may take the same, and
hold them to be disposed of as the court may direct.
BISHOP, supra.
78. Holker v. Hennessey, 42 S.W. 1090, 1093 (Mo. 1897). As the Montana
Supreme Court explained, the “power” to conduct an evidence-gathering search
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The long-standing acceptance of the search-incident doctrine,
and the evidence-gathering assumptions that underlie it, were the
likely reason that the Court was not called upon until 1914 in
Weeks v. United States to consider the legitimacy of a search
incident to arrest.79 And, as Justice Alito observed in his Riley
concurrence, since the Weeks decision the Court has never
eliminated evidence gathering as a legitimate basis to perform a
properly limited search incident to a lawful arrest.80
A. Evidence-Gathering Searches Incident to Arrest: The SearchIncident Doctrine’s Original Rationale
The Court’s first approval of a search incident to arrest appears
in dictum in Weeks v. United States, where the Court explained
that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures was not implicated when police “search[ed]
the person of the accused [when he or she had been] legally
arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime,”
because that search had “always [been] recognized under English
and American law.”81 Weeks’s reference to the search of an
arrestee’s person was thereafter expanded, first, to include the area
“in [the arrestee’s] control,”82 and then later, to a search of “the
place where the arrest is made.”83 The Court’s discussions evolved
from dictum into law in 1927 in Marron v. United States,84 which

at the time of a lawful arrest existed by virtue of the arresting officer’s “public
duty,” which necessitated an immediate search following arrest because
otherwise “all evidences of crime and of identification of the criminal might be
destroyed before the prisoner could be taken before the magistrate.” Id.
79. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); see supra text
accompanying note 66.
80. Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“And neither in Weeks nor in any of the authorities discussing the
old common-law rule have I found any suggestion that [the search-incident
doctrine] was based exclusively or primarily on the need to protect arresting
officers or to prevent the destruction of evidence.”).
81. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92.
82. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
83. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
84. 275 U.S. 192 (1927). In Marron, federal agents secured a search warrant
to look for intoxicating liquors at a certain location, and while executing the
search warrant, the agents arrested an individual whom they encountered on the
premises for operating an illegal drinking establishment. Id. at 193–94. Based
upon the authority of that arrest, the agents seized items not listed in the search
warrant—including an incriminating ledger the agents found in a closet—in a
search that Marron upheld because the ledger was “part of . . . [the] equipment
actually used to commit the offense.” Id. at 194, 199.
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upheld as reasonable a premises search incident to the arrest of a
person whom federal agents caught committing a crime when they
arrived to execute a search warrant.85
From 1927 until Chimel was decided in 1969, the Court
struggled to reconcile competing lines of authority—with one line
turning on the proper scope of a search incident to arrest, and the
other on the triggering circumstances that would make the search
available to law enforcement in the first place.86 Prior to Chimel,
incident searches were assumed to be evidence-gathering
searches—searches directed at uncovering evidence of the crime of
arrest.87 The right to conduct an evidence-gathering search arose
from the authority of a lawful arrest, leaving the Court to consider
whether the incident search at issue was “reasonable”—a question
that generally turned on the scope of the evidence-gathering
search.88 To determine reasonableness, the Court considered each
search’s “own facts and circumstances.”89 Under this potentially
open-ended rationale, incident searches of entire homes or offices
were upheld if the Court was satisfied that arresting officers were
searching for evidence of the crime of arrest, not just rummaging
through the arrestee’s things to see “whatever might be turned
up.”90 If the Court concluded that officers were legitimately
looking for evidence of the crime of arrest, expansive and
extremely thorough premises searches incident to an occupant’s
arrest were often permitted,91 based on the Court’s broad
85. Id. at 199 (upholding incident search of premises because “[the agents]
had a right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to
find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise”).
86. See infra notes 90–102 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Marron, 275 U.S. at 198–99; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
41–42 (1963) (plurality opinion); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235–41
(1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61–66 (1950), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752;
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151, 155 (1947), overruled by Chimel,
395 U.S. 752.
88. See, e.g., Marron, 275 U.S. at 198–99.
89. See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357
(1931) (“There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness.”).
90. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 61–62 (upholding incident search of arrestee’s
one-room business office, including desk, safe, and file cabinets, over a period
of one and one-half hours; search “was not general or exploratory” because
officers were searching for evidence of crime of arrest—stamps with forged
overprints).
91. Harris, 331 U.S. at 153 (upholding incident search of arrestee’s fourroom apartment over five-hour period to look for forged checks for which
defendant had been arrested; “[t]he search was not a general exploration but was
specifically directed to the means and instrumentalities by which the crimes
charged had been committed”).
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interpretation of the areas within an arrestee’s “control” or
“possession” that might conceal evidence of the crime of arrest.92
The volatility of search-incident doctrine arose, however,
because even “specific[]”93 searches—those in which law
enforcement was looking for evidence of the crime of arrest—were
sometimes struck down if the Court believed that it would have
been “practicable” for the investigating officers to obtain a search
warrant prior to their arrest of the premises’ occupant.94 In the
practicability cases, the Court refused to limit its analysis to
determining whether the incident search was reasonable in scope.
Instead, the Court focused on whether proper triggering circumstances
for the warrantless search were present—an analysis that turned on
whether law enforcement could have obtained a search warrant, but
failed to do so.95 Although the practicability approach advanced the
goal of imposing a categorical warrant requirement,96 it did so only
92. Cf. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760 (recounting expansive premises searches
upheld under Rabinowitz).
93. See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 62 (“Specificity was the mark of the search
and seizure here.”), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752; see supra note 90.
94. See, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705–10 (1948)
(“[N]o reason whatever has been shown why the arresting officers could not
have armed themselves during all the weeks of their surveillance of the locus
with a duly obtained search warrant . . . .”), overruled by Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 65 (rejecting argument that search-warrant requirement should be
“crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search”), overruled
by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752.
95. See, e.g., Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 347 (1957) (per
curiam) (rejecting warrantless incident search of entire cabin and seizure of
cabin’s contents because agents had cabin under surveillance for twenty-four
hours).
96. Cf. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“[O]ur jurisprudence lurched back and forth between imposing a
categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone. . . . By the
late 1960’s, the preference for a warrant had won out, at least rhetorically.”
(citations omitted)). Based upon a textual analysis of the Fourth Amendment,
Professor Lloyd Weinreb described the warrant-requirement debate as follows:
A thoughtful and strict grammarian might conclude from the structure
of the amendment that the second clause is a partial explication of the
first, so that any search conducted without a warrant is, by that fact
alone, unreasonable. . . . Another grammarian might conclude that the
first clause stated a condition for application of the second, so that there
was a requirement that a search not be “unreasonable” independent of
the particular requirements of the warrant clause.
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV.
47, 47–48 (1974). By the late 1960’s, the Court had settled on the warrant
preference approach. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
(“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
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marginally—in those cases where it was clear that police had been
watching the suspect for some (undesignated, but nevertheless
unreasonable) period of time. The practicability approach never
fully won out, however, and additionally, injected new uncertainties
into the Court’s search-incident-to-arrest determinations—by
requiring consideration of whether exigent circumstances existed—
such as whether the arrestee was apprehended while committing a
felony in the officer’s presence,97 or whether the situation
otherwise called for quick action on the part of law enforcement.98
Deciding which of these competing lines of cases would
control in any given fact situation forced the Court to rely on hairsplitting distinctions between the facts involved in the two lines.99
The Court’s repeated vacillations—likely symptomatic of its
conflicted view of the categorical warrant requirement itself100—
contributed to the schizophrenia of the Court’s search-incident
caselaw101 and produced the jurisprudential pendulum swings for
which the search-incident-to-arrest exception is so well known.102

subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”
(citations omitted)).
97. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 462–63 (1932), abrogated by
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
98. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42 (1963) (plurality opinion) (upholding
premises search because defendant’s “furtive conduct” established that “time
clearly was of the essence” in preventing loss of contraband).
99. See, e.g., Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 464–65 (distinguishing similar incident
search to the one upheld in Marron because Marron involved seizure of
materials used “to carry on the criminal enterprise,” but the incident search in
Lefkowitz was an “exploratory and general” search “made solely to find
evidence of respondents’ guilt”); Harris, 331 U.S. at 153 (distinguishing GoBart Importing Co. and Lefkowitz because officers in Harris were specifically
looking for canceled checks that were evidence of crimes charged), overruled by
Chimel, 395 U.S. 752; Ker, 374 U.S. at 42 (distinguishing Trupiano because
agents in Trupiano had been in possession of information sufficient to obtain
search warrant for three weeks, while officers in Ker “had reason to act quickly”
to prevent the likely loss of marijuana); see supra notes 87–99 and
accompanying text.
100. See supra note 96.
101. Cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 67 (1950) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“In recent years, the scope of the [search-incident-to-arrest] rule has
been a subject of almost constant judicial controversy both in trial and appellate
courts. In no other field has the law’s uncertainty been more clearly
manifested.”), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752.
102. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009) (recounting the
“checkered history of the search-incident-to-arrest exception”).
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B. The Pendulum Swings in Chimel v. California
It is argued in the present case that it is “reasonable” to
search a man’s house when he is arrested in it. But that
argument is founded on little more than a subjective view
regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police
conduct, and not on consideration relevant to Fourth
Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analysis,
Fourth Amendment protection in this area would approach
the evaporation point.103
After its decision in United States v. Rabinowitz,104 the Court’s
preference for search warrants105—rather than determining the
search’s “reasonableness” on a case-by-case basis—had become
manifest, leading to the sea change that was Chimel.106 In Chimel,
police went to Chimel’s home with a warrant for Chimel’s arrest
for a coin-shop burglary.107 No search warrant for Chimel’s home
had been obtained, however.108 Chimel’s wife allowed the officers
to wait inside the house until Chimel returned from work.109 When
Chimel entered the home, one of the officers handed him the arrest
warrant and asked for permission to “look around.”110 Chimel
refused but was told that, “on the basis of the lawful arrest,”
officers were permitted to conduct such a search.111 What ensued
was a search of the entire three-bedroom house—including the
attic, garage, and a small workshop—that took between forty-five
minutes and an hour.112 During that search, items were seized that
103. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764–65 (1969).
104. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. See supra notes
90, 93; cf. Weinreb, supra note 96, at 73 (“In the wake of Rabinowitz, some
lower courts all but ignored the warrant clause whenever the police had made a
related arrest.”).
105. See supra notes 96 and accompanying text.
106. Compare Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 65–66 (“The mandate of the Fourth
Amendment is that the people shall be secure against unreasonable searches. . . .
The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search was reasonable.”), with Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (“[Searches
of areas beyond those justified by arrest-related exigency], in the absence of
well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search
warrant. The ‘adherence to judicial processes’ mandated by the Fourth
Amendment requires no less.”).
107. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755. Chimel accepted the California Supreme
Court’s conclusion that Chimel’s arrest was valid “[w]ithout deciding the
question.” Id.
108. Id. at 754.
109. Id. at 753.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 753–54.
112. Id. at 754.
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were introduced over Chimel’s objection at his trial on the burglary
charges.113 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
constitutionality of the incident search of Chimel’s home,
observing that the Court’s cases on this issue “have been far from
consistent, as even the most cursory review makes evident.”114
If the Chimel Court had been limited to its two prior lines of
authority, yet another hair-splitting decision would have resulted—
the incident search in Chimel could have been analyzed under
either of the Court’s two lines. Based on the Rabinowitz line, the
officers’ search of Chimel’s entire house incident to his arrest was
arguably reasonable.115 The officers were looking for coins and
other small items that were stolen in the burglary of a coin shop,
items that could easily have been hidden anywhere inside Chimel’s
home. On the other hand, the officers’ failure to obtain a search
warrant for Chimel’s home despite the fact that they apparently
could have done so was potentially fatal under the practicability
line.116 Rather than continue down either of those competing paths,
the Chimel Court reoriented the search-incident doctrine away from
reasonableness determinations—under which a search warrant was
not constitutionally required117—to, instead, a warrant exception
that was justified by the exigency arising from arrest itself:
protection of officer safety and the need to preserve evidence.118
In establishing the scope of an incident search based on arrestrelated exigency, Chimel explained:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the
area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a
weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed
by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of
113. Id.
114. Id. at 755.
115. Id. at 766 (explaining that the Court could “draw a line” between the
premises searches in Rabinowitz and Harris and the premises search in Chimel,
although “such a distinction would be highly artificial”).
116. Cf. id. at 775 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]here was surely probable cause
on which a warrant could have issued to search the house for the stolen coins.”).
117. See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
118. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (majority opinion).

50

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting
officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a
search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his
immediate control”—construing that phrase to mean the
area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.119
By relying on officer safety and preservation-of-evidence
concerns, Chimel both framed its analysis in terms of a warrant
exception and laid to rest the long-contested scope issue for
premises searches incident to arrest. Chimel overruled United
States v. Rabinowitz120 and Harris v. United States,121 and in doing
so, rejected those cases’ expansive view of the area within an
arrestee’s control, which courts had come to view as the arrestee’s
entire home.122 Importantly, however, Chimel never overruled
those cases’ evidence-gathering rationale, just the expansive
premises searches that the seemingly unconfinable evidencegathering basis had produced.123 Chimel was therefore directed at
finding an endpoint for premises searches incident to arrest, as
opposed to categorically rejecting Rabinowitz and Harris’s
evidence-gathering rationale if the premises search was properly
limited to the areas supported by arrest-related exigency.124
In fact, even Chimel itself recognized law enforcement’s
general interest in evidence gathering during searches incident to
arrest—albeit limited to the areas justified by Chimel’s exigency
rationale—language that is inconsistent with construing Chimel to
119. Id. at 762–63 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. See supra note
90.
121. 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. See supra note
91.
122. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768 (“It is time . . . to hold that on their own facts,
and insofar as the principles they stand for are inconsistent with those that we
have endorsed today, [Rabinowitz and Harris] are no longer to be followed.”).
123. Cf. id. at 766 (“No consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment
suggests any point of rational limitation, once the search is allowed to go beyond
the area from which the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary
items.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973) (explaining
that Chimel “overruled Rabinowitz and Harris as to the area of permissible
search incident to a lawful arrest” (emphasis added)).
124. Chimel’s focus on scope—rather than on Rabinowitz’s evidencegathering rationale—is reflected in Chimel’s observation that Rabinowitz’s
expansive view of the area within an arrestee’s control was a doctrine that “at
least in the broad sense in which it was applied by the California courts in this
case, can withstand neither historical nor rational analysis.” See Chimel, 395
U.S. at 760 (emphasis added).
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require the potential destruction of evidence as a precondition for a
Chimel search. Although Chimel referenced “destructible evidence” in
describing the scope of a properly limited premises search,125 Chimel’s
holding also supported evidence gathering of the crime of arrest as an
additional search-incident motivation. As the Chimel Court explained:
“The search [in Chimel] went far beyond the petitioner’s person and
the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or
something that could have been used as evidence against him.”126
Chimel’s use of language such as “gain[ing] possession”127 and
“obtain[ing]” a weapon or evidentiary items128 is in no way
inconsistent with an evidence-gathering basis to search incident to
arrest. Chimel used those descriptions to establish its reaching-distance
limitation129—an entirely separate question from what it is that an
arrestee might lunge to “obtain.”130 Especially telling, in the early
years after Chimel the Court harmonized Chimel with the search125. See id. at 763; see supra text accompanying note 119.
126. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 763.
128. Id. at 768. See supra text accompanying notes 119, 126.
129. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (1969) (including within scope of valid
incident search “the area into which an arrestee might reach” (emphasis added));
see supra text accompanying note 119; Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615,
635 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing Chimel as articulating
“reaching-distance principle” in establishing scope of valid incident search); see
also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981) (describing Chimel as
authorizing incident search of items “within an arrestee’s reach”), abrogated by
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011); cf. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623 n.3
(majority opinion) (explaining that Belton adopted “bright-line rule” concerning
scope of vehicle search because determining whether item in vehicle’s passenger
compartment was “within an arrestee’s reaching distance under Chimel” was
“unworkable”).
130. Cf. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768. The view that Chimel was based solely
upon arrest-related exigency—the need to search for weapons and to prevent the
loss of destructible evidence—was likely bolstered by the Court’s opinions that
used this portion of Chimel’s rationale as a basis to distinguish Chimel from
other warrantless searches. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)
(differentiating more-limited search permitted in frisk from search incident to
arrest because frisk was “not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance
or destruction of evidence of crime”); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 649
(1983) (Marshall, J., concurring) (distinguishing inventory search from search
incident to arrest, explaining that “[a] warrantless search incident to arrest must
be justified by a need to remove weapons or prevent the destruction of
evidence”). However, these cases’ comparisons to Chimel suggest no
disapproval of Chimel’s treatment of evidence gathering as an additional
motivation to perform a search incident to arrest (within Chimel limits). See
supra notes 119–129 and accompanying text. And, importantly, these opinions
are in no way inconsistent with the post-Chimel cases in which incident searches
were supported, in part, by the need to gather evidence of the crime of arrest.
See infra note 131 and accompanying text.

52

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

incident doctrine’s evidence-gathering basis. As the Court’s early postChimel cases reflect, evidence gathering of the crime of arrest
remained a legitimate law enforcement rationale to search incident to
arrest—so long as the scope of that search was limited to the areas
designated in Chimel. 131
Chimel was silent, however, on the issue of whether the nowlimited search was available even when the search’s justifications
were not present. Therefore, after Chimel, even if arresting officers
avoided searches that pushed Chimel’s exigency-based outer
boundary (the arrestee’s reaching distance), the question remained
whether authority to search incident to arrest would be generalized
to all arrests, even those in which the arrestee was handcuffed and
the scene was under the control of law enforcement. The Court
granted certiorari to answer this question, at least as it pertained to
the search of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest, just four years
later in United States v. Robinson.132
In Robinson, the defendant was lawfully arrested and taken into
custody for driving with a revoked license.133 During a pat-down
search, the arresting officer felt an object in Robinson’s coat
pocket that the officer could not identify from its shape.134 The
officer retrieved the object from Robinson’s pocket and found it to
be a “crumpled up cigarette package,”135 which the officer opened
and found heroin capsules inside. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed Robinson’s eventual
conviction for possession of heroin, finding that the arresting
officer lacked probable cause to believe that the cigarette package
131. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 482 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (“We did not indicate [in Chimel] . . . that the police must obtain a
warrant if they anticipate that they will find specific evidence during the course
of [a search incident to arrest].”); Id. at 514 (White, J., concurring and
dissenting) (arguing that while Chimel “narrowed the permissible scope of
incident searches,” Chimel did not require law enforcement to obtain a warrant
to “discover evidence of crime” within a “properly limited” search incident to
arrest); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292, 296 (1973) (upholding, as valid
under Chimel, the warrantless taking of fingernail scrapings from murdersuspect husband, even though husband was not arrested for wife’s murder until a
month later); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802 (1974) (explaining
that warrant exception for incident searches “has traditionally been justified by
the reasonableness of searching for weapons, instruments of escape, and
evidence of crime” (emphasis added)); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 575–76 (1991) (“Under Belton, the same probable cause to believe that a
container holds drugs will allow the police to arrest the person transporting the
container and search it.”).
132. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
133. Id. at 220–21.
134. Id. at 223.
135. Id. (quoting arresting officer).
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contained a weapon or evidence of the crime of arrest—driving
without a license.136
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the D.C. Circuit’s
ruling, and in doing so, articulated the first of its generalized
interpretations of Chimel. In Robinson, the Court authorized a
search of the arrestee’s person incident to arrest in all cases, and
additionally, refused to require a case-by-case determination of
whether a basis to search the arrestee was present under Chimel’s
twin rationales.137 As Robinson explained:
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful
custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to
discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may
later decide was the probability in a particular arrest
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found
upon the person of the suspect.138
With the authority to perform an incident search of the
arrestee’s person generalized to all arrests in Robinson, most courts
likewise assumed that police were authorized to perform a Chimel
search of the arrestee’s reaching distance in every case even if the
arrestee was handcuffed and adequately secured at the time of the
search.139 However, Chimel proved especially problematic when
136. Id. at 227.
137. Id. at 235 (holding that an incident search of the arrestee’s person was
both an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and was
“also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment”).
138. Id. Prior to the Court’s recent decision in Riley, some courts interpreted
Robinson’s generalized authority to search an arrestee’s person incident to arrest
to, additionally, support the warrantless search of the arrestee’s cellular phone
if—like the cigarette package at issue in Robinson—the phone was found on the
arrestee’s person. See, e.g., People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at
*6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013) (citing People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505 (Cal.
2011)) (upholding incident search of arrestee’s cellular phone because “[People
v.] Diaz controls the present case, and the key question is whether Riley’s cell
phone was ‘immediately associated’ with his ‘person’ when he was stopped”),
rev’d and remanded by Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); see also
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484; see supra note 10.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 886–88 (9th Cir. 1991)
(upholding incident search of bedroom in which arrestee was arrested, even
though arrestee had been handcuffed and moved to a different room at time of
search, because the bedroom that police searched had been within arrestee’s
control when he was arrested and police acted reasonably in moving arrestee to
a different room before searching); United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 330
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (acknowledging that determination of arrestee’s reaching
distance “ha[d] not been interpreted rigidly” because arrests involve
“dangerous,” rapidly unfolding circumstances; police “cannot be expected to
make punctilious judgments regarding what is within and what is just beyond
the arrestee’s grasp”). But see United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 273 (3d
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the arrestee’s reaching distance included the passenger
compartment of a vehicle.140 State and federal appellate courts
divided on whether to apply the fact-specific Chimel analysis to
incident searches of vehicles, or instead, a generalized rule like the
one articulated in Robinson. Robinson’s reliance on a bright-line
search-incident rule141 may have contributed to the Court’s
willingness to craft additional generalized rules to govern vehicle
searches incident to arrest.142
The Court granted certiorari in New York v. Belton to resolve the
then “widespread conflict” in the state and federal courts concerning
whether police could search the passenger compartment of a vehicle
incident to an arrest of the vehicle’s occupant.143 The arrestee in
Belton was one of four men riding in a vehicle that was lawfully
stopped for speeding.144 The lone investigating officer soon
determined that probable cause existed to arrest the vehicle’s
occupants for possession of marijuana.145 The officer instructed the
men to exit the vehicle, patted them down, separated them from one
another, and then proceeded to search the passenger compartment
of the vehicle.146 The officer found cocaine in the zippered pocket
of Belton’s jacket, which was located on the back seat of the car.147
The New York Court of Appeals invalidated the incident search of
Cir. 2002) (invalidating incident search of bag located approximately three feet
from arrestee because arrestee was handcuffed with his hands behind his back,
face-down, guarded by two officers, and the bag was zipped closed).
140. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2011) (“This rule
may be stated clearly enough, but in the early going after Chimel it proved
difficult to apply, particularly in cases that involved searches inside of
automobiles after the arrestees were no longer in them.” (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted)).
141. See Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (“A highly
sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts . . . may be
the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges
eagerly feed, but they may be literally impossible of application by the officer in
the field.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
142. Cf. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620 (2004) (majority
opinion) (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)) (explaining that the
Belton Court had considered benefits of Robinson’s bright-line rule in arriving at
generalized search-incident rules for vehicles).
143. Cf. id. at 633 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recounting background giving
rise to grant of certiorari in Belton).
144. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981).
145. The officer smelled “burnt marihuana” upon approaching the vehicle
and observed an envelope marked “Supergold” on the vehicle’s floorboard,
which the officer associated with marijuana. Id. at 455–56.
146. Id. at 456.
147. Id.
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the vehicle, however, because at the time of the search the
vehicle’s four occupants were under arrest and the vehicle and its
contents were “safely within the exclusive custody and control of
the police.”148 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
because “courts ha[d] found no workable definition of the area
within the immediate control of the arrestee when that area
arguably includes the interior of an automobile.”149
Rather than following Chimel’s fact-intensive determination of the
area within the arrestee’s reaching distance, Belton articulated a
generalized rule concerning the scope of a vehicle search incident to
arrest—the vehicle’s entire passenger compartment.150 Belton
supported its generalization that the vehicle’s entire passenger
compartment was within an arrestee’s reaching distance by
highlighting the need for a “straightforward,” “workable rule” that
could be readily understood and administered by officers in the
field.151 Belton additionally established generalized rules concerning
“containers” uncovered during an incident search.152 As Belton
explained:
[P]olice may also examine the contents of any containers
found within the passenger compartment, for if the
passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so
also will containers in it be within his reach. Such a
container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or
closed, since the justification for the search is not that the
arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the
lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any
privacy interest the arrestee may have.153
Belton described a “container” as “any object capable of
holding another object,” which Belton then illustrated with a list of
receptacles such as “luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the
like.”154 Finally, Belton limited its broad, generalized authority to
perform vehicle searches incident to arrest with an additional
148. People v. Belton, 407 N.E.2d 420, 423 (N.Y. 1980), rev’d, New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
149. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 459–60 (“In order to establish the workable rule this category of
cases requires, we read Chimel’s definition of the limits of the area that may be
searched in light of that generalization.”).
152. Id. at 460.
153. Id. at 460–61 (citations omitted).
154. Id. at 460 n.4. Belton further explained that “closed or open glove
compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the
passenger compartment” were “container[s]” for Belton purposes. Id.
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generalized rule—an incident search of an arrestee’s vehicle does
not include the vehicle’s trunk.155
Belton’s generalized rules were far less defensible than the
common sense protections that Robinson provided to law
enforcement, however.156 After Belton, police treated incident
searches of vehicles as an “entitlement,”157 engaging in the practice
even when there was no legitimate danger to officers or risk that
evidence in the vehicle could be concealed or destroyed.158 Lower
courts’ expansive interpretations of the already-generalized Belton
rules did not go unnoticed. In Thornton v. United States, two
members of the Court went out of their way to criticize this police
practice while addressing another Belton issue that had plagued the
lower courts159—the question of whether a vehicle search incident
to arrest should be expanded to include the vehicle of an arrestee
who was simply within reaching distance of his or her vehicle, but
was not actually inside it, at the time the officer initiated contact.160
Relying on Belton, the Court in Thornton adopted a “recent
occupant” trigger, meaning that Thornton extended Belton’s
generalized rules to allow a Belton search of an arrestee’s vehicle
if the arrestee was a recent occupant who was near the vehicle at
the time of arrest—rather than relying on Chimel’s fact-specific
determination of the arrestee’s reaching distance.161

155. Id. (“Our holding encompasses only the interior of the passenger
compartment of an automobile and does not encompass the trunk.”).
156. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); see supra
notes 137–38.
157. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Willis, 37 F.3d 313, 316–18 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. White,
871 F.2d 41, 43–44 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868,
871–72 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148–50 (10th
Cir. 1985).
159. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 (O’Connor, concurring) (criticizing
police practice of conducting Belton search of vehicle after arrestee had been
secured, which Justice O’Connor viewed as “a direct consequence of Belton’s
shaky foundation”). Justice Scalia argued that the police practice of handcuffing
an arrestee and securing him or her in the back of a squad car meant that “[i]f it
was ever true that the passenger compartment is in fact generally, even if not
inevitably, within the arrestee’s immediate control at the time of the search, it
certainly is not true today.” See id. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
160. See id. at 617–19 (majority opinion).
161. Id. at 623–24 (“So long as an arrestee is the sort of ‘recent occupant’ of
a vehicle such as petitioner was here, officers may search that vehicle incident to
the arrest.”).
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Thornton managed to cobble together a five-vote majority in
favor of expanding Belton’s generalized search-incident rule, even
though it was clear that most Justices on the Court believed that
Belton had been pushed too far.162 Although Thornton did not
overturn Belton, the writing was on the wall—or at least in Justice
Scalia’s concurrence—that the broad interpretation of Belton’s
already-generalized rule was vulnerable.163 There, Justice Scalia
examined the search-incident doctrine as it had existed prior to
Chimel.164 Justice Scalia argued that the pre-Chimel searchincident doctrine clearly supported evidence gathering as a
legitimate basis to search incident to arrest:
There is nothing irrational about broader police authority to
search for evidence when and where the perpetrator of a
crime is lawfully arrested. The fact of prior lawful arrest
distinguishes the arrestee from society at large, and
distinguishes a search for evidence of his crime from
general rummaging. Moreover, it is not illogical to assume
that evidence of a crime is most likely to be found where
the suspect was apprehended.165
Rather than relying on Chimel’s generalized bases to search—
which authorized police to perform a Belton search of the
arrestee’s vehicle in every case—Justice Scalia instead argued for a
more privacy-protective approach that supported a Belton search
only when a reasonable basis existed to believe that the arrestee’s
vehicle contained evidence of the crime of arrest.166 According to
Justice Scalia, “[i]f Belton searches are justifiable, it is not because
the arrestee might grab a weapon or evidentiary item from his car,
but simply because the car might contain evidence relevant to the
crime for which he was arrested.”167

162. Justice O’Connor provided the crucial fifth vote in Thornton. Id. at 625
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
163. See Leslie A. Shoebotham, The (Inevitably Arbitrary) Placement of
Bright Lines: Belton and Its Progeny, 79 TUL. L. REV. 365, 394–99 (2004)
(anticipating Gant’s adoption of evidence-gathering basis to justify incident
search of arrestee’s vehicle, as well as Gant’s use of alternative holdings in
authorizing evidence-gathering search).
164. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629–32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 630.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 629.
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C. The Pendulum Swings Again: A Doctrine in Transition
The criticisms voiced in Thornton set the stage for the Court’s
reconsideration of search-incident doctrine in Arizona v. Gant.168
There, officers who were already aware that Gant’s driver’s license
had been suspended observed Gant pull into the driveway of a
house being investigated as a drug house.169 Gant got out of his
vehicle, shut the door, and approached the officers.170 The officers
met Gant about ten to twelve feet from his vehicle, arrested him for
the driver’s license violation, and placed him in handcuffs.171 Gant
and two other individuals who had been arrested at the scene for
other crimes were secured in three separate squad cars. The
passenger compartment of Gant’s vehicle was then searched.172
The officers found cocaine and a gun in Gant’s vehicle, which
Gant sought to suppress because: (1) he had been secured at the
time of the Belton search and therefore could not have accessed the
passenger compartment of his vehicle, and (2) he had been arrested
for a traffic violation for which no evidence could have been
present in his vehicle.173 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
explaining that “[t]he chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton
includes courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have
questioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to Fourth
Amendment principles.”174
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, authored an opinion
that clearly reflected the compromise required in obtaining Gant’s
five majority-opinion votes. Gant set out two alternative holdings,
one pertaining to Belton and the other authorizing the evidencegathering search (with important modifications) that Justice Scalia
argued for in his Thornton concurrence.175 In the first of its
alternative holdings, Gant rejected the broad, or generalized, view
of the authority to perform a Belton search of a vehicle when the
search was not supported by arrest-related exigency—those cases
in which the arrestee was secured in the back of a squad car.176
168. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
169. Id. at 335–36.
170. Id. at 336.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 338.
175. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 630 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
176. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (holding that “the Chimel rationale authorizes
police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment
at the time of the search”).
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Importantly, Gant did not overrule Belton, finding instead that in
“the rare case” where “an officer is unable to fully effectuate an
arrest so that a real possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle
remains,” a Belton search is still available.177
In its other holding, Gant pressed evidence gathering as the
primary basis for a vehicle search incident to an arrest of the
vehicle’s recent occupant, explaining that “[a]lthough it does not
follow from Chimel, we also conclude that circumstances unique to
the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when
it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest might be found in the vehicle.”178 Justice Scalia provided
Gant’s crucial fifth vote in a concurrence that suggests Belton and
Thornton could be on borrowed time.179 As Justice Scalia
explained, the truth behind “Belton’s fanciful reliance upon officer
safety” was a “return” to the evidence-gathering searches that were
permitted prior to Chimel.180 The compromise nature of Gant’s
majority opinion becomes fully apparent in Justice Scalia’s
admission that he joined the majority only to avoid a “4–to–1–to–4
opinion” that would “leave[] the governing rule uncertain.”181
Justice Alito wrote a scathing dissent—in which three other
Justices including the Chief Justice joined—which focused
primarily on the majority’s de facto rejection of Belton and
Thornton and the majority’s failure to justify its decision on stare
decisis principles.182 Importantly, Justice Alito criticized the
majority’s reconfiguration of Belton, from determining whether
177. Id. at 343 n.4. The Gant Court invalidated the incident search of Gant’s
vehicle because law enforcement could not reasonably have believed that Gant
could access his vehicle once he was handcuffed and secured in a squad car. Id.
at 344.
178. Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Thornton, 541 U.S.
at 632). Although Gant recognized the validity of an evidence-gathering
incident search of an arrestee’s vehicle, the search of Gant’s vehicle, was
rejected because no evidence of Gant’s crime of arrest—driving without a
license—existed in Gant’s vehicle. See id. at 343–44 (“Because police could not
reasonably have believed . . . that evidence of the offense for which [Gant] was
arrested might be found [in his vehicle], the search in this case was
unreasonable.”).
179. Cf. id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view we should simply
abandon the Belton-Thornton charade of officer safety and overrule those
cases.”).
180. Id.
181. See id. at 354. As Justice Scalia explained: “I am therefore confronted
with the choice of either leaving the current understanding of Belton and
Thornton in effect, or acceding to what seems to me the artificial narrowing of
those cases adopted by Justice Stevens.” Id. Because failing to limit Belton and
Thornton represented the “greater evil,” Justice Scalia joined the majority. Id.
182. See id. at 358 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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exigency existed at the time of the arrest to, instead, on whether
exigency remained present at the time of the search.183
Additionally, Justice Alito’s criticism seemed to be directed at the
majority’s failure to finish the job, arguing that it made no sense to
fundamentally alter Belton without also reconsidering Chimel, the
case on which Belton relied—because Belton had taken its
“timing” benchmark from Chimel.184 By not reexamining Chimel,
Justice Alito argued that Gant “leaves the law relating to searches
incident to arrest in a confused and unstable state.”185
III. RILEY’S IMPACT: BEYOND THE CELL PHONE CONTEXT
Few areas of the law have been as subject to shifting
constitutional standards over the last 50 years as that of the
search “incident to an arrest.” There has been a remarkable
instability in this whole area, which has seen at least four
major shifts in emphasis. . . . [R]apid reversals have
occurred before, but they are rare.186
Riley is deceptive. On the one hand, Riley’s categorical protection
of cell phone data has been enthusiastically received.187 And, the fact
that Riley was one of the modern Court’s rare unanimous decisions
might suggest that Riley’s only potential controversy involves the
decision’s likely impact on law enforcement.188 But Riley’s narrow
view of what constitutes search-incident precedent is telling.189 Riley
represents more than a common sense cell phone privacy decision.
Instead, Riley is a digital age reboot, reorganizing the search-incident
doctrine into a singular Chimel-based rule that turns out to have a
vehicle exception.
A. The Doctrinal Implications of Reconfiguring Gant
The Riley Court treated Gant as if it were nothing more than a
limited evidence-gathering exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
183. Id. at 361–64. See infra note 199 and accompanying text (criticizing
majority’s use of a passenger-compartment limitation on its evidence-gathering
search of an arrestee’s vehicle).
184. Gant, 556 U.S. at 363.
185. Id.
186. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 770–71 (1969) (White, J.,
dissenting).
187. See supra note 22.
188. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (“We cannot deny
that our decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to
combat crime. . . . Privacy comes at a cost.”).
189. Cf. id. at 2484; see supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
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warrant requirement—an exception that had nothing to do with
Chimel.190 Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, Gant
created a hybrid incident search—a search that was justified by
evidence gathering, yet was limited in scope by Chimel’s arrestrelated exigency concerns191—consistent with other incident
searches that the Court upheld in the early years after Chimel was
decided.192 The hybrid nature of Gant’s evidence-gathering search was
fully revealed in Gant’s explanation that, under its evidence-gathering
holding, law enforcement could search “the passenger compartment of
an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein”193—a limitation that
Riley retained.194 Therefore, ironically enough, Riley endorsed a
Chimel-based limitation—the passenger compartment of the arrestee’s
vehicle—while also deciding that Gant’s evidence-gathering search

190. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484, 2492; see supra notes 26, 55–65 and
accompanying text.
191. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009) (majority opinion); cf.
Eunice Park, Traffic Ticket Reasonable, Cell Phone Search Not: Applying the
Search-Incident-To-Arrest Exception to the Cell Phone as “Hybrid”, 60 DRAKE
L. REV. 429, 479 (2012) (using “hybrid” to describe a cellular phone itself
because cell phones have some characteristics of traditional containers but differ
due to high expectation of privacy in information stored thereon).
192. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
193. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added). In other words, Belton’s
generalized limitation that incident searches of vehicles must exclude the
vehicle’s trunk was also applied to Gant’s evidence-gathering search. Cf. id.
(“An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking in this case. . . . [because]
Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license—an offense for which
police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant’s
car.” (emphasis added)). Cf. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981);
see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
194. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (describing Gant as adding “an
independent exception for a warrantless search of a vehicle’s passenger
compartment when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest might be found in the vehicle” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Importantly, Gant’s majority opinion also contained support for the
view that its evidence-gathering search was not limited to the vehicle’s
passenger compartment. See, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. at 351 (holding that “[p]olice
may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search
or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of
arrest” (emphasis added)); id. at 346 (same); id. at 343 (describing evidencegathering search as not available “when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic
violation [because] there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle
contains relevant evidence” (emphasis added)). However, Riley ignored this
potentially inconsistent authority in concluding that Gant imposed a passengercompartment limitation on its evidence-gathering search.
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was an “independent” exception—an exception that Riley
seemingly separated from the search-incident doctrine itself.195
From a practical perspective, Riley’s apparent disconnection of
Gant from the search-incident doctrine injects problematic
instability into Gant’s evidence-gathering search. If Gant’s
evidence-gathering search is truly independent of Chimel, then
several questions flow from that vision of Gant. Left unresolved by
Riley is whether an arresting officer who performs an evidencegathering vehicle search under Gant should be permitted to search
every item in the passenger compartment of the arrestee’s vehicle
(a la Belton),196 as opposed to searching only those items in the
passenger compartment for which the officer has a legitimate basis
to believe might contain evidence of the crime of arrest. In other
words, when Gant’s evidence-gathering search is paired with
Belton’s generalized scope rules, the resulting search of the
vehicle’s passenger compartment might be more probing than what
is supportable on the basis of suspicion alone.197
On the other hand, the scope of Gant’s hybrid vehicle search
will sometimes be too narrow—since a legitimate basis to search
for evidence of the crime of arrest (as contrasted with a Chimelbased search to look for weapons or destructible evidence) might,
in an appropriate case, also extend to the vehicle’s trunk.198 As
Justice Alito argued in his Gant dissent, a passenger-compartment
limitation simply had no relevancy to an evidence-gathering search
of a vehicle:
Nor is it easy to see why an evidence-gathering search
incident to arrest should be restricted to the passenger
compartment. The Belton rule was limited in this way
because the passenger compartment was considered to be
the area that vehicle occupants can generally reach, but
since the second part of the new rule is not based on officer
safety or the preservation of evidence, the ground for this
limitation is obscure.199

195. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484, 2492; see supra notes 26, 55–65, 194 and
accompanying text.
196. Cf. Belton, 453 U.S. 454; see supra notes 150–55 and accompanying
text.
197. See People v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 904 (Ct. App. 2011) (“A
close reading of Gant makes clear that [the scope of] warrantless vehicular
searches incident to arrest as established by Belton is unchanged.”).
198. Cf. Gant, 556 U.S. at 364 (Alito, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (citations omitted).
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Apparently not satisfied with leaving the origin of Gant’s
evidence-gathering vehicle search “obscure,”200 Riley instead
disconnected Gant’s two searches altogether—and did so on the basis
of nothing more than the Court’s own rhetoric.201 Certainly, a
passenger-compartment limitation was not what Justice Scalia had in
mind in his Thornton concurrence.202 There, Justice Scalia explained
that an evidence-gathering incident search of a vehicle was justifiable
if “the car might contain evidence relevant to the crime for which [the
arrestee] was arrested.”203 The standard for such a search, Justice
Scalia posited, was “reason[] to believe evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”204 Further, Justice Scalia’s
Thornton concurrence supported evidence gathering as a justification
for incident searches based upon the lawfulness of the arrest,205
without reference to the passenger-compartment limitation that Riley
expressly embraced.206 As Justice Scalia explained in Thornton:
There is nothing irrational about broader police authority to
search for evidence when and where the perpetrator of a
crime is lawfully arrested. The fact of prior lawful arrest
distinguishes the arrestee from society at large, and
distinguishes a search for evidence of his crime from general
rummaging. Moreover, it is not illogical to assume that
evidence of a crime is most likely to be found where the
suspect was apprehended.207
Nothing about Justice Scalia’s Thornton concurrence suggests that
he favored limiting an evidence-gathering incident search of an
arrestee’s vehicle to the vehicle’s passenger compartment. Yet, Gant
seemingly imposed a definitional outer boundary—the vehicle’s
passenger compartment—on its evidence-gathering search of a vehicle
incident to an arrest of the vehicle’s occupant.208 In describing its
200. Cf. id.
201. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014); see supra notes
26, 57–59 and accompanying text.
202. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629–30 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
203. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 630.
206. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
343); see supra notes 26, 57–59, 194 and accompanying text.
207. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 630 (emphasis in original).
208. As Gant explained:
If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of
criminal activity, United States v. Ross authorizes a search of any area
of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found. Unlike the
searches permitted by Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the
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evidence-gathering search, Gant first endorsed the search that Justice
Scalia advocated in Thornton but then recast it by distinguishing it
from probable cause-based searches of vehicles.209
Because Gant distinguished its evidence-gathering search from a
search performed under the automobile exception,210 it is surprising
indeed that Riley uncritically lumped those two searches together in its
now-expanded view of the automobile exception.211 Riley’s
reconfiguration of Gant was not required to impose a warrant
requirement on cell phone searches. The sui generis nature of
electronic devices—based on their vast capability for storing personal
information and the absence of danger to law enforcement—was a
sufficient basis for treating cellular phones differently from
conventional containers.212 Considering the Court’s repeated course
changes in interpreting the search-incident doctrine,213 the Riley
Court’s willingness to embroider this volatile warrant exception is
risky. Going forward, pretending that Gant’s two searches do not both
arise from the search-incident doctrine will mean, at the very least, that
the Chimel-based limitations on Gant’s evidence-gathering search are
vulnerable.
B. Restricting Gant’s Evidence-Gathering Search to Vehicles
Riley concluded that Gant’s evidence-gathering search was
limited to incident searches of vehicles—and only vehicles.214 As
Riley explained, “Gant relied on circumstances unique to the
judgment in Thornton, . . . Ross allows searches for evidence relevant
to offenses other than the offense of arrest, and the scope of the search
authorized is broader.
Gant, 556 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 820–21 (1982)). But see supra note 194.
209. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
211. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492; see supra notes 26, 62–64 and
accompanying text.
212. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485, 2488–89 (treating a cellular phone as its
own “category” of effects; rejecting government’s argument that search of cell
phone data was “‘materially indistinguishable’” from incident search of
“physical items,” stating “[t]hat is like saying a ride on horseback is materially
indistinguishable from a flight to the moon”); see supra notes 24–25, 52–54 and
accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 770–71 (1969) (White, J.,
dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 186. See also United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 67 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled by Chimel,
395 U.S. 752; see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
214. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484; see supra notes 62–64 and accompanying
text.
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vehicle context to endorse a search solely for the purpose of
gathering evidence.”215 Importantly, however, although Riley
limited Gant’s evidence-gathering holding to vehicle searches,
Riley was silent as to whether Gant’s first holding—Gant’s
limitation of Belton—was applicable in non-vehicular cases.216
After Gant, courts have increasingly been asked to do that very
thing—to prohibit Chimel searches of the reaching distance of a
pedestrian-arrestee or a person arrested at home, once that arrestee
has been secured.217 This argument certainly comes as no surprise
to Justice Alito. As he predicted in his Gant dissent, there was
simply “no logical reason” why Gant’s Belton-limitation—which
bars police from performing an incident search once the arrestee is
adequately secured—“should not [also] apply to all arrestees.”218
And Riley will only increase this argument’s momentum. In
concluding that Chimel’s two concerns were not legitimately
present in cell phone searches,219 Riley itself extended Gant’s
Belton-limiting reasoning to a non-vehicular context.
For those who value Chimel, limiting Gant’s evidencegathering search to incident searches of vehicles, as Riley has

215. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343
(2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
216. See generally id. at 2484–86, 2492 (describing and treating Gant’s first
holding—Gant’s limitation of Belton—separately from Gant’s evidencegathering holding, explaining that “Chimel concerns for officer safety and
evidence preservation underlie the search incident to arrest exception”).
217. Cf., e.g., United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 317, 319 (3d Cir. 2010)
(interpreting Gant’s limitation of Belton to require consideration of whether
defendant—who was waiting in check-in line at hotel when arrested for a prior
bank robbery—“retained sufficient potential access” at time of search to gym
bag he had been carrying, despite being handcuffed and guarded by two officers;
incident search of gym bag uncovered cash from bank robbery); cf. Smallwood
v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 727, 735, 740 (Fla. 2013) (invalidating incident search
of cellular phone found on person of pedestrian–arrestee based, in part, on
Gant’s Belton limitation because police “separated [the arrestee] from the phone
by securing him in a police vehicle,” therefore “no issue existed with regard to
officer safety or evidence preservation”); see generally Nicholas De Sena,
Comment, Searches Incident to Arrest and the Aftermath of Arizona v. Gant—A
Circuit Split as to Gant’s Applicability to Non-Vehicular Searches, 33 PACE L.
REV. 431 (2013) (collecting post-Gant cases in which Gant’s Belton-limitation
was extended to non-vehicular cases in prohibiting incident search of arrestee’s
reaching distance once arrestee was adequately secured, as well as cases that
refused to extend Gant’s Belton-limitation to non-vehicular cases).
218. Cf. Gant, 556 U.S. at 363–64 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that Gant
majority’s reorientation of Chimel—determining arrest-related exigency at the
time of the search, not arrest—could not “logic[ally]” be limited to vehicle
searches); see supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 41–54 and accompanying text.
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done,220 will, ironically enough, produce irreparable harm to
Chimel. To explain, if Gant and Riley’s reasoning—that incident
searches are not available unless Chimel’s concerns are
legitimately present—is extended to all arrestees, police could be
required to justify, on a case-by-case basis, performing a Chimel
search of an arrestee’s reaching distance once the arrestee is
secured. And, in evaluating reaching-distance searches, courts will
no doubt be asked to accept law enforcement’s extravagant
assessments of the danger posed by handcuffed arrestees, even
those surrounded by several officers—all in an attempt to satisfy
Chimel’s twin rationales.221
Practical problems will also result. If courts are required to
ignore evidence gathering as an implicit motivation for a properly
limited incident search—in favor of Chimel’s (and only Chimel’s)
twin rationales—police might be tempted to create an exigency
basis to search an arrestee’s reaching distance by omitting security
precautions that police would otherwise ordinarily take at an arrest
scene.222 Additionally, extending Gant’s limitation of Belton to
non-vehicular cases will necessitate a case-by-case determination
of whether arrest-related exigency remained present at the time of
the search, not arrest223—a significant departure from the rulesoriented analysis that is this warrant exception’s primary selling
point.224 If arrest-related exigency under Chimel dissipates (even in
non-vehicular cases) once an arrestee is adequately secured, law
enforcement could be required to obtain a warrant to search the
arrestee’s reaching distance or the items found therein—even if the
search was both properly limited under Chimel and legitimately
directed at uncovering evidence of the crime of arrest.225
220. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492 (majority opinion); see supra notes 57–59
and accompanying text.
221. Cf., e.g., United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 811–12 (7th Cir. 2008)
(upholding search of entertainment center in arrestee’s “tiny” apartment on basis
of Chimel, even though arrestee was “[h]andcuffed, lying face down on the
floor, and surrounded by police” because “police did not know how strong he
was, and he seemed desperate”); see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
222. Cf. Gant, 556 U.S. at 362 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that
determining exigency at time of search would create a “perverse incentive” to
leave arrestees unsecured, which would mean that “the law would truly be, as
Mr. Bumble said, ‘a ass’” (quoting United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664,
669 (D.C. Cir. 1996))).
223. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 141, at 141; see supra note 141.
225. See, e.g., United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 2010)
(finding “no plausible reason” that Gant’s Belton-limitation should be confined
to incident searches of vehicles “rather than [applying] in any situation where
the item searched is removed from the suspect’s control between the time of the
arrest and the time of the search”).
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Instead, courts should harmonize the search-incident doctrine’s
historical evidence-gathering basis with Chimel’s bright-line rules
establishing the search’s scope in all incident searches,226 not just
vehicle searches incident to arrest under Gant. And, by recognizing
evidence gathering of the crime of arrest as a legitimate basis in
most cases to perform a properly limited Chimel search of an
arrestee’s reaching distance, courts can avoid what will otherwise
be a debate about: (1) How secure is “secured”?; and (2) Did the
arresting officer omit adequate security precautions in order to
justify performing a Chimel search? Recognizing evidence
gathering as an implicit search-incident motivation will prevent
Chimel’s generalized rules from being “stretch[ed] . . . beyond
[their] breaking point.”227
C. Procurement of Evidence: A Condition Precedent to
Preservation
One of Chimel’s twin concerns was based on the need for law
enforcement to find and seize “any evidence on the arrestee’s
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”228 Yet,
to preserve evidence from destruction, the arresting officer must
first find the evidence and remove it from the arrestee’s control:
procurement. In his Riley concurrence, Justice Alito recognized
that an obvious condition precedent to preservation is removal of
evidence from the arrestee’s possession or control, thus eliminating
the risk of destruction.229
Although Justice Alito did more in Riley than Justice Scalia,
for example, to protect evidence gathering as a justification for
incident searches,230 Justice Alito’s concurrence could be clarified
226. Because the Riley Court treated cellular phones as a special “category of
effects,” this proposal would, of course, have no impact on incident searches of
cellular phones. Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014); see supra
notes 24–25, 52–54, 212 and accompanying text.
227. Cf. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
228. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). But even Chimel
contained language that supports evidence gathering as a justification in a
properly limited search incident to arrest. See supra notes 125–30 and
accompanying text.
229. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[O]nce [written] items
[found on the person of the arrestee] are taken away from an arrestee (something
that obviously must be done before the items are read), there is no risk that the
arrestee will destroy them.”).
230. Although Justice Scalia has argued that evidence gathering is a
justification for incident searches more generally, he nevertheless joined the
opinion of the Court in Riley without writing separately or joining Justice Alito’s
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to recognize the dual nature of the term, “preservation.” Justice
Alito argued that officer safety and “evidence preservation” did not
fully explain the justifications for the search-incident doctrine.231
To expand on Justice Alito’s thoughts, “preservation” encompasses
more than simply preventing the concealment or destruction of
evidence. The term necessarily encompasses procurement of
evidence (the first half of the act of “preserving”) as well as
preventing the destruction or concealment of evidence (the second
half of the act of “preserving”). After all, one cannot preserve what
one has not procured.
Interestingly, an older cell phone case that upheld a warrantless
cell phone search—of course, decided before Riley—contains an
apt discussion of preservation. In United States v. Finley, law
enforcement established a pre-Riley legitimate basis to search
Finley’s cellular phone for evidence of the crime of arrest—
conspiracy to sell methamphetamine.232 Upon his arrest, Finley
told the investigating agents that Brown, the other arrestee, had
called him to request a ride to the truck stop in order for Brown to
purchase cigarettes. Finley claimed, however, that he knew nothing
of Brown’s plan to sell drugs at the truck stop.233 Because Finley
told the agents that he and Brown had communicated by phone to
set up the ride to the truck stop, law enforcement had a legitimate
basis—prior to Riley—to search Finley’s phone because there was
reason to believe that evidence of the drug conspiracy might be
found in the phone’s call log and text messages.
“Preservation,” as the term was used in Finley,234 suggested a
broader basis to search than would be supportable under Riley’s
rigid interpretation of Chimel’s “destructibility” concern.235 For the
Fifth Circuit, “preservation” arguably meant nothing more than
that law enforcement had “obtained” or “secured” the cell phone
evidence for its eventual use at trial. In so saying, Finley clearly

concurrence. Cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing in a DNA case that “[t]he objects of a search incident to
arrest must be either (1) weapons or evidence that might easily be destroyed, or
(2) evidence relevant to the crime of arrest”); see also supra note 165 and
accompanying text.
231. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (arguing that the seizure and removal of
“written items” from the arrestee’s control, similar to the seizure of a cellular
phone, dissipates Chimel’s twin rationales).
232. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 2007).
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486–87 (2014); see
supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
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assumed that an evidence-gathering basis to search incident to
arrest existed if the scope of that search was otherwise proper
under the search-incident exception.236 Although Finley framed its
analysis in terms of Chimel-based cases, Finley was, in reality, a
limited evidence-gathering search incident to arrest.
The point of harmonizing Justice Alito’s concurrence and
Finley’s interpretation of “preservation” is that an evidencegathering rationale—in a properly limited search incident to
arrest—exists independently of Chimel even though there is
generally a confluence between the two concepts. Although
Chimel is concerned with what an arrestee might do—injure an
officer or destroy evidence—evidence gathering is concerned with
what an officer might do: obtain probative evidence of the crime of
arrest that could aid in the arrestee’s conviction. The confluence
exists by virtue of the manner in which the evidence is obtained—
in response to an arrestee’s actions or in furtherance of a
conviction.
The fact that evidence gathering existed nearly 200 years
before Chimel as a basis for a search incident to arrest lends further
support to the notion that preservation first requires procurement.
In other words, the search-incident doctrine has a tripartite basis:
evidence gathering of the crime of arrest, officer safety, and
preventing the destruction of evidence. Or, in short hand: procure,
protect, and prevent. It just so happens that “preservation” in most
cases encompasses both procurement and prevention—even
though procurement has a historical pedigree that substantially
antedates Chimel’s “prevention” annex to the search-incident
doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
The idea that officer safety and the preservation of
evidence are the sole reasons for allowing a warrantless
search incident to arrest appears to derive from the Court’s
reasoning in Chimel v. California . . . . As I have explained,
Chimel’s reasoning is questionable, and I think it is a
mistake to allow that reasoning to affect cases like these
that concern the search of the person of arrestees.237
When Chimel was decided in 1969, the decision was seen as
the cure for an unresolvable judicial ailment: establishing physical
boundaries for premises searches incident to arrest. In Chimel and
236. Cf. Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–61.
237. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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the cases that generalized Chimel, the Court articulated bright-line
search-incident rules that, although relying on Chimel’s twin
concerns, never excluded evidence gathering as a legitimate
motivation to search within an otherwise properly limited search
incident to arrest. Riley v. California’s warrant requirement for cell
phone searches resolved a number of problematic legal issues that
had arisen in applying the Court’s bright-line search-incident
doctrine to a new technological device—cellular phones—searches
that raised privacy concerns on a scale previously unknown in the
pre-digital age.238 Yet, just because Riley addressed a digital age
problem does not mean that the Riley Court had carte blanche to
ignore pre-digital age doctrine.
Although Riley appears to be a straightforward holding—
cellular phones contain vast quantities of private information that
cannot be searched incident to arrest absent a warrant—the path
Riley blazed in reaching this outcome represents an important
retcon of the search-incident doctrine. The “strife of Riley,” as
suggested in this Article’s title, is that the Riley Court reshaped the
search-incident doctrine, molding it into a Chimel-based rule that
just so happens to have a vehicle exception.239 Riley treated Gant
as an outlier—an exception on wheels. Never mind that one of the
driving forces behind Gant was Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Thornton v. United States240—a concurrence that relied on the
search-incident doctrine’s historical basis as an evidence-gathering
search, not a simple elaboration on the automobile exception. After
Riley, evidence gathering seems to have been left in the dust—
nothing more than a pit stop on the highway to a search-incident
doctrine that is now based exclusively on officer safety and
preventing the destruction of evidence. Only Justice Alito
recognized the Riley Court’s error in excluding evidence gathering
as a legitimate rationale in a properly limited search incident to
arrest. And, judging from the ancient history of the search-incident
doctrine and the consequences that Riley’s most recent doctrinal
reorganization will have, Justice Alito was right.

238. Id. See supra note 53.
239. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
240. 541 U.S. 615, 625–32 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). See supra notes
165–167 and accompanying text.

